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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview. In this paper we study a quantitative-theoretic general equilibrium
model in which changes in monetary policy can haveimportant welfare consequences for
economic agents. Our main finding is an estimate of the welfare cost of inflation which is
an order of magnitude larger than estimates found in the literature. The most important
reason for this finding is that, in the economy we study, higher inflation reduces real
returns to all assets in a quantitatively important way, and therefore forces agents to
alter their life cycle consumption, work and savings plans. This createsa large distortion,
because realinterest rates are the central allocation mechanism in the neoclassical growth
framework we use.
Economic growth in the model is driven by exogenous technological change and labor
force growth. We use standard specifications for preferences and technology, and we em-
ploystandard rationalexpectations, market-clearing assumptions throughout. We include
costly financial intermediation, transactions money demand, and tax elements, including
taxation of nominal quantities, but we maintain the principle that these features com-
plicate the analysis no morethan strictly necessary. Agents gain utility by consuminga
single nonstorable good and by taking leisure; they have finite lives andsave for life-cycle
reasons by holding government bonds, renting physical capital to firms, and making con-
sumption loans to other households. Monetary policy is a growth rate for the monetary
base which translates into a steady state rate of inflation. In this paper we study steady
states, mostly to allow direct comparison to other research in this area. We estimate a
stationary equilibrium of the model that matches avariety of important facts about the
postwar U.S. economy.
From this briefdescription ofour model it is already clear that it includes a number of
distortions other than inflation. These distortions include costly financialintermediation,
direct proportionaltaxation oflabor andcapital income, and governmentdebt that returns
relativelylow realinterest rates. The largewelfare costofinflation that we report is largely
due to [1] theinteraction ofinflation with taxation of nominal income from capital and [2]
the effect ofthis interaction on the before-and after-tax real interest rates on government
debt. Although our intermediation-cost assumptions play an important role in allowing
our model to replicate key features of postwar-U.S. data, they have little effect on the
magnitude ofour welfare-cost estimates.
From a policy perspective, the fact that inflation derives most of its welfare effects
from interaction with the tax system need not be aconcern, since it is total welfare cost
of inflation, taking other features of the economy as given, that is the crucial yardstick
by which judgements must be made. But from a theoretical perspective, as well as for
purposes of comparison to other research in this area, one would like to know how muchHow Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 2
of the total cost of inflation is a “purely monetary” cost—a cost of the type studied in
the literature on the optimum quantity of money—and how much ofit is due to inflation
interacting with the tax system. For this reason, we devote some effort to estimating the
size ofvarious welfareeffects ofinflationand attributing them to the appropriate sources.
The bottom line ofthis exercise is that in our model the purely monetary welfare cost of
inflation is about as large as previous estimates in the literature. Thus, the largewelfare
cost of inflation that we report is due to the interaction of inflation with the tax system.
We are able to go further and decompose this tax interaction into two components,
eath of which involves the effect of inflation on real rates of return. The first component,
a direct tax effect, occurs because higher inflation increases effective capital income tax
rates, reducing the after-tax real rate of return associated with any before-tax real rate
of return. This type of effect has been studied by Feldstein (1996), among others. The
second component, a general equilibrium effect, involves the tendency of higher inflation
to reduce before-taxreal interest rates. It is attributable to the fact that, all else equal,
increases in the inflation rateproduce significant increases ingovernment revenues. These
revenue increases result in an endogenous reduction in the stock of debt the government
must roll over and the pretax real interest rate on this smaller stock of debt. Effects of
this type havenot been described previously, even by other researchers who havestudied
the welfare cost of inflation in general equilibrium models.
Decomposing the overall welfare effect of inflation into these two components leads to
an important finding: locally, in theneighborhood ofour baseline equilibrium, thegeneral
equilibrium effect of a change in the inflation rate is about3~ times as large as the direct
tax effect. Thus, the general equilibrium nature ofour analysis is essential to our findings,
as is the ability ofthe particular general equilibrium model we employ to give government
policy the power to havea significant impact on pretax real interest rates.
We also report results on the nature of disinflation policies. The government in our
model, like the U.S. government, relies on seigniorage for a relatively small portion of
its financing. It can reduce inflation from moderate levels without increasing existing
tax rates or reducing the ratio of government expenditures to real output. However,
our analysis suggests that beyond acertain critical low rate of inflation this is no longer
possible. Further disinflation must thenbe accompanied by a reduction in government
expenditures relativetooutput, an increase in other distortionary taxes, or both. In other
words, government budget problems become more severe once inflation moves below the
critical rate. We estimate that the U.S. economy is currently near the critical rate, and
so we look at this problem in some detail. We conclude that there are stifi benefits from
moving to lower inflation rates, even if other distortionary taxes are increased in order to
maintain government spending at its pre-disinflation share of real output. In particular,How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 3
ifthe lost revenues are replaced by increasing afl’direct taxes equally in percentage point
terms, then the welfare gain produced by moving to zero inflation from our baseline
inflation rate of four percent isabout 2.86 percent ofthe baselinelevelof output, or about
$217 billion in 1996 dollars. However, our estimates also indicate that once the critical
inflation rate is reached, the marginal benefit from lower inflation may be muchsmaller
if the fiscal authority reacts to a loss of revenue by increasing other, more distortionary
taxes. Thus, our analysis is somewhat sobering on the prospects for disinflation beyond
certain limits, since it implies that reducing the inflation rate below the critical rate
requires coordination (tacit or otherwise) between the fiscal and monetary authorities—
coordination that is not necessary when the monetary authority disinflates from higher
levels.
1.2. Recent related literature. The welfare cost of inflation literature is large, and
we cannot summarize it effectively here. Recent quantitative estimates of the welfare
costof inflation in general equilibrium models include Cooley and Hansen (1989), Dotsey
and Ireland (1996), Gomme (1993), Haslag (1995), Imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991),
Jones and Manuelli (1993), Lacker and Schreft (1996), and Lucas (1994). This list is
representative, though not exhaustive, and we will use the results of several of these
studies as a benchmark comparison for our results. A recent paper on the interaction
of inflation with the tax code is Feldstein (1996). Feldstein (1996) does not attempt a
full general equilibrium analysis, but nearly all of the discussion, including the effect of
inflation in reducing realrates ofreturn received by savers, as well as the implications for
government finance, is consistent with the general equilibrium ofour model. A conference
commentary on Feldstein (1996) by Abel (1996) analyzes tax interaction effects in a
general equilibrium framework considerably different from ours, and finds a significant
welfare cost, but one that is about halfas large as the welfare cost isolated in this paper.’
Important work on banking in computable general equilibrium models which we view as
related to ours is by Dfaz-Giménez, Prescott, Fitzgerald and Alvarez (1992) and Prescott
(1993).
‘Similarly, Black, et at., (1994), isolate a welfare cost ofinflation coming mostly from inflation in-
teracting with nominal taxation in a general equilibrium model calibrated to Canadian data. But their
comparable effects are less thanone-fifth the size of the effects isolated in this paper (See their Table 3,
second column, last two entries). Interestingly, the endogenous growth and epen economy versions of
their model suggest that suth extensions enlarge the calculated welfare cost ofinflation significantly. We
think this is an important area for future research.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 4
2. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM LIFE CYCLE MODEL
.1. Overview. Our model can be succinctly described as “Sargent andWallace meet
Auerbach and Kotlikoff.” Auerbach and Kotlikoff(1987) pioneered the study of general
equilibrium life cycle models for the study ofpublic finance questions, but the framework
has rarely been applied to questions in monetary theory.2 Our model differs from Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1987) mainly in that we have monetary elements, explicit growth and
depreciation, and a production technology compatible with real business cycle models.3
Sargent and Wallace (1981, 1982, 1985) used small-scale overlapping generations models
to study fundamental questions in monetary theory and policy. We have adopted aspects
of their approach, such as careful attention to the government budget constraint in ana-
lyzing monetary policy issues. In addition, the source of money demand in our model is
that intermediaries hold reserves, which is an application of the legal restrictions theory
studied by Sargent and Wallace. However, we interpret our money demand specification
as a proxy for a transactions demand for money, not as a legal restriction. Our money
demand specification can be viewed in thesame light as the cash-in-advancespecifications
often employed in the welfare cost of inflation literature.4
In constructing the model, we label parameters in two ways. For parameters that are
not very controversial, in the sensethat they map more or less directlyinto available data,
we will use conventional symbols. In the quantitative exercise, we will deduce and assign
values for these parameters directly from available data—this will be the fixed parameter
vector, F, of our model. The remaining parameters—deep parameters in preferences and
technology, as well as our intermediation cost, money demand, and two tax parameters;
nine in all—will be denoted öj, i = 1, ..., 9 and together constitute the deep parameter
vector, ~i, of our model. Much less is known about these parameters in the abstract and
so it is less clear what values should be assigned to them. A further complication is that
achange in one of the deep parameters often helps to fit the data on one dimension while
being detrimental on other dimensions. One way to express this situation is that the
map from the parameters to the data defines a rugged surface in a space of endogenous
outcomes, and so it is not clear that estimating or calibrating parameter values using
standardtechniqueswill deliver globally optimal values. Weadopt the followingapproach
2
An exception is Altig and Carlstrom (1991).
3
Rios-Rull (1994) studies a general equilibrium life cycle modelwith aggregate technology shocks. The
model has no source ofmoney demand and no role for monetary policy. Our model includes money and
permits thestudy ofmonetary policy, but it is not stochastic. Aggrepte uncertainty will not matter for
the types of steady state comparisons undertaken in this paper. Rios-Rull’s findings suggest that if a
technology shock was added to our model, the implied business cycle features would be similar to those
ofreal business cycle models. See also Rios-Rull (1995).
4
See Haslag (undated) for a discussion ofsome fairly general conditions under which cash-in-advance
and reserve requirement economies are allocationally equivalent.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 5
to this problem. A steady stateof our model will have many implications for observable
quantities we can estimate from the data, such as the aggregate capital-to-output ratio.
We will use a nonlinear optimizer (a genetic algorithm) to choose a vector of values for
the deep parameters to come as close as possible to a vector of targets on observable
quantities, following the principle of an equal number of targets and deep parameters.
The targets on observable quantities we select are natural ones from the perspective of
our model. We will return to a more detailed explanation of this strategy following our
presentation of the model.
2.2. Preferences. A generationof identicalagents (a.k.a. households) is born at each
discrete date t = ..., —2, —1, 0, 1, 2, ..., and lives for n 55 periods. We interpret the
time period in the model as a year. Successive generations of agents are identified by
their birthdates and differ from each other only in their populations, which grow at a
gross rate of 1’ 1 per period. Each agent is endowed with a single unit of time per
period, as well as an effective labor productivity coefficient e~ at each period of life i,
i = 1,..., n. Preferences are defined over intertemporal bundles that include the quantity
of thesingle good consumed at each date and the quantity ofleisure enjoyed at each date.
The consumption and leisure choices of a member of generationt at datet+j are denoted
ct(t +j) and £~(t +j), i = 0, ..., n — 1, respectively, where subscripts denote birthdates
and parentheses denote real time.
The preferences of the agents are described by the standard utility function
U({ct(t +j),t~(t~ = ~~ ~ +j)
5~
(t ~j)1_5s]l~2 (1)
where ‘52 >0, (53 >0, and ‘5o 1/(1 +5,), with 6, > —1. We require ct(t+j) 0
and £~ (t +j) E [0,1] Vt,j. These preferences imply that the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption, a, is the inverseof the coefficient ofrelative risk aversion, i’,
where ii 1— (53(1 — 52). Because this is an overlapping generations model, no restrictions
are placed on the value of5,, other than 5, > —1. We will therefore use this parameter to
help ushitour target forthe averagegrowthrate ofhouseholdconsumptionoveralifetime.
We define an effective rate of time preference, ~‘ 1 — (1 + 5,)_h/52, for this model based
on the rate of consumption growth agents would choose when faced with a zero net real
interest rate.5 The parameter 53 is the elasticity of intratemporal consumption-leisure
5
This is easiest to see by considering a two period endowment model with inelastic labor supply and




2. The first order conditions imply Ct (t+ 1) =
(~5oR (t))’/
6
2 Ct (t), where R(t) is the gross real interest rate between date t and t+1 that the agent
faces. The effective rate of time preference we define, ~, is the arithmetic opposite of the consumption
growth rate that occurs when the agent faces a zero net real interest rate. Thus, ~p= —(ct(t + 1)/ct(t)How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 6
substitution, and is the dominant parameter governing the share of available time the
agent devotes to market activity. We require households to retire from the labor force at
anagen*~n;thatis,t~(t~j)=1forj=n*_1,...,n_1.
2.3. Technology. Each period there are an arbitrary number of competitive firms
that have access to a technology that uses labor and capital to produce the consumption
good. Theaggregate stock ofcapital goods availablefor use inproduction atthe beginning
of date t is denoted K(t). Since the technology exhibits constant returns it suffices to
describe an aggregate production function
Y(t) = A0~_o4)(t_l)K(t)ö4L(t)l_ö4, (2)
where L(t) is the aggregate supply of effective labor and k(t) K(t)/L(t) is the ratio
of capital to effective labor. The parameter )~ 1 is the gross rate of growth of labor
productivity, and the parameter 54 E (0,1) governs the capital share of output. Capital
goods depreciate at a net rate of 55 10,11 per period. The firms rent capital and
hire effective labor at rental and wage rates equal to these inputs’ respective marginal
products: the rental rate is r(t) = A(l_ö4)(t_l)54k(t)~4_land the wage rate is w(t) =
— 54)k(c)54.
2.4. Asset market structure. There are four assets in the model: physical capital,
consumption loans, government bonds, and fiat currency. We assume that all borrowing
and lending in the economy takes place through perfectly competitive intermediaries.
Households that rent capital to the firms or make consumption loans to other households
are paid therealreturnsnet ofaconstant cost per unit of capital intermediated; we denote
the cost 66 E (0,1). Households that save by holding government bonds are paid the real
returns net of a smaller cost; for purposes of simplicity, we push this cost all the way to
zero. We willestimate thevalue ofthe cost parameter 56 with thehelp ofestimates of the
size of the financial intermediation sector in the postwar U.S. economy. These estimates,
which were constructed by Dfaz-Giménez, et al. (1992), are displayed in Figure 1. They
suggest that the quantity of resources devoted to financialintermediation in the U.S. is
large—roughly 5 to 7 percent of GDP in the early 1980s.
Our asset market structure is simple and stark, in keeping with our principle that the
financial intermediation, tax and monetary features of the analysis should not complicate
the model any more than absolutely necessary. The rationale behind our intermedia-
tion cost assumption is simple. In actual economies there are a great many firms and
households, so that it is difficult to match borrowers and lenders and to make sure that
—1) IR(t)=1~which, from the first order condition, is ~ = 1— ~~/52, or 1 —(1 +6j)h/~2. This result
carries over to the multi-period model with elastic labor supply that we study.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 7
~ Figure 1. Financial intermediatiOn in theU.S.
It
.s i ii ii I II IIII I IIIIII III IIIII III
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Year
A Lowerbound Cl Upperbound
Figure 1: The value of financial intermediation services provided in the U.S. economy is large.
The boxes and triangles represent upper (total product basis) and lower (value added basis)
bounds, re~pectivély, as calculated by D~az-Giménez, et al., (1992). The lines are simple mid-
points based on linear interpolation between data points and extrapolation of existing trends
(solid line) and no trend (dotted line) at theend of the sample.
borrowers have the ability and inclination to repay their loans. Lending to the govern-
ment, on the other hand, isa relatively simple matter since there is only one borrower (or
a small number of borrowers) whose characteristics are well known.6
Wecomplete our asset market specification by assuming that financial intermediaries
holda constant fraction 57 (0,1) oftheir liabilities in the form of fiat currency reserves.
As we have indicated, we use reserve demand as a proxy for base money demand from
all sources—most of which are presumably associated with the need to hold money to
facilitate transactions. Reserve demand is a simple way of ensuring that in the equilibria
of our model, money demand will be closely related to national income. We will use
monetary and income data for the postwar U.S. economy to help estimate the value of
the 57 parameter.
6
Recent work on financial intermediation in macroeconomic models includes Boyd and Smith (forth-
coming), Bernanke and Gertle,.(1989), Greenwood and Williamson (1989), Williamson (1987), andD~az-
Giménez, et al. (1992). Our approachis most closely related tothe latterpaper. Luttmer (1996) analyzes
asset pricing ineconomies related to ours with frictions in the form of transactions costs.
Strictly speaking, theagents inour model would preferto avoidthe financial intermediation technology
altogether by purchasing government bonds directly orby lending directly to other householdsor to firms.
However, we interpret our environment as one inwhich householdscould not avoid thetransactions costs
associated with lending by attempting to provide their own intermediation services.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 8
2.5. .JL’he government. The governmentin the model isa consolidated federal, state
and local entity. We will target the size of the government in our model using data from
the national income and product accounts. At date t the government must finance real
expenditures ofG(t) bya combination ofdirect taxation andseignorage. Theexpenditures
growat gross rateA~, theaggregate growthrateofthe economy, sothat G(t+l) = )~G(t).
Government expenditures are assumed to leave the economy.
The government collects the bulk ofits revenues using threedirect proportional taxes:
a tax on labor income levied at rate 58 E [0,1), a tax on the nominal interest income of
households levied at rate r2
E [0,1), and a “corporate profits tax” on the finns’ nomi-
nal returns to capital levied at rate
5
g E [0,1). Our tax structure is intended to be a
parsimonious representation of the current U.S. tax system. Our representation reflects
two important features of the U.S. ~ystem for taxing capital income: double taxation of
dividend income and the fact that household interest income and corporate earnings are
taxed on a nominal basis. Lump-sum taxation is assumed to be unavailable.
2.6. Arbitrage conditions. Our assumptions about money demand, intermediation
and tax structure determine the interest rate structure of the economy. The lowest gross
real rate ofreturn in the economy will be the return to realcurrency balances,which is
R’~(t) = P(t)/P(t + 1), where P(t) is the nominal price of the consumption good at time
t. The gross inflation rate is 1/R”(t) = P(t + 1)/P(t). The highest gross real rate of
return will be the total return to capital, which is Rk(t) 1 + r(t + 1), where r(t + 1)
is the marginal product of capital defined above. The gross real return to capital net of
depreciation is then R~(t) Rk(t) — 55. In our specification, firms are taxed on their
nominal, net-of-depreciation returns to capital, so the after-tax gross real rate of return
they pay to intermediaries is R!ea(t) (1 — 59)R’~(t) + 69R’~(t).7This is also the gross
realrate of return on consumption loans, Rd(t), since arbitrage forcesconsumption loans
and capital to pay equal returns.
Because financial intermediation is costly, intermediaries are not willing to pay the
gross real rate Rbol(t) to household savers. Intermediation costs are 56 per unit ofcapital
intermediated, so the net-of-intermediation-costs gross real rate of return is Rin(t)
R’~(t)— 66. In addition, intermediaries cannot lend the entire amount of their deposits
because they hold reserves. They therefore pay a weighted average of the real return
on fiat currency and the net-of-intermediation costs real return to capital: this defines
the gross real rate of return on deposits as Rd(t) (1 — 57)R’”~(t) + 57R’~(t). Since
7
The gross nominal return to capital employed at date t — 1 is R~c~~(t — 1)/R’~(t — 1), so at date tthe
firms have to make a nominal tax payment to the government ofög ((R~(t— 1)JR’~(t — 1)) — i) K(t —
1)P(t — 1). Firms’ total real net-of-depreciation earnings are Rk12(t — 1)K(t — 1). Dividing the former
expression by P(t) to put it into real terms and then subtracting it from the latter expression produces
the gross rate of return expression given in the text. A similar calculation defines R’~below.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 9
bonds are intermediated costlessly, arbitrage implies that this is also the gross real rate
of return to bonds, which we denote R”(t). Households ~haveto pay taxes on nominal
interest income at rate r~, sothe after-tax gross realrate of return on depositsis R~M (t)
(1 —
7
i) R’~(t) +r~R’~(t). This is also the gross real after-tax rate of return on bonds,
which we denote R~’(t).
Thus, our steady state asset return structure will obey the following:
~ (3)
The gross nominal interest rates are these gross real rates divided by Rh. The monetary
authority determines R’~ through its conduct ofmonetary policy. The equilibrium condi-
tions of the model can be thought ofas determining the equilibrium value of R”~,and the
tax, intermediation cost and money demand parameters then determine the remainderof
the interest rate structure.
2.7. Household decisions. Households maximize (1) subject to a lifetime budget
constraint, which we now define. Wedenote the date t+j demand for assets of an agent
born at date t by at(t +j), i = 0~ ..., n — 1. Agents can borrow or lend in any period of
life. If they borrow at date t then they pay the gross real rate Rin(t). If they lend by
holding deposits with the financial intermediary then they earn the gross real after-tax
return R~(t).The budget constraints of an agent born at date t are
(4)
c~(t) + at(t) = (1 — 58)w(t)ei (1 —




R(t + n — 2)at(t + n — 2),
where w(t) is the before-tax real wage at date t, and
_f R’~(t+j) if at(t+j) <0, ( ~ Rd~(t+j) if at(t+j) 0.
Aggregate assets at date t are
A(t) t_iat_j(t),How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 10
where we~are normalizing the date C population to unity. We can decompose A(t) into
A+(t), the aggregate asset demand of the agents whose asset demand is non-negative
at date C, and A(t), the aggregate asset demand of the agents whose asset demand is
negative at time C. The first group earns a gross rate ofreturn R&~(t) = Rba(C), while the
second group must pay interest at gross rate R~(t). We will define A(t) as a positive
number, so that A(t) = A~(t)— A (C). The liabilities of the financial intermediaries are
then K(t) +A(t). Agents can choose corner solutions for a particular period of lifej, in
which case they set at(t +j) = 0.
2.8. The government budget constraint. The government taxes labor income at
rate 6~,so aggregate labor income tax revenues at date t are T’(t) 58w(t)L(t). The
government also taxes household net nominal interest income at rate r~, producing nom-
inal tax revenues at date t of ri[Rd(C — 1)/R”~(t — 1) — 1]A~(t— 1)P(t — 1) and real
revenues of T~(t) [Rd(C — 1) — R”~(t — 1)]A~(t— 1). The corporate profits tax
produces nominal revenues of 59(R~(t— 1)/R’~(t — 1) — 1) K(t — l)P(t — 1), so that
real revenues are T’~(t) Sg (R~(t— 1) — R/2(t — 1)) K(t — 1). Government revenues
from currency and bond seignorage at date t are C8(t) H(t)— R’~(t)H(t— 1) and
B5(t) B(C) — Rb(t — 1)B(t — 1), respectively.8 The government budget constraint is
therefore
G(t) = T1(t) + Tz(t) +Tk(t) + C3(t) + B5(t) (5)
where G(t) 0 Vt.
2.9. Equilibria. Agents hold aggregate deposits D(t) with intermediaries. The in-
termediaries use a fraction of these deposits to acquire fiat currency reserves: 67D(t) =
H(t)/P(t), where H(t)/P(t) denotes aggregate real balances. The remainder of the de-
posits are lent to firms and households: (1 — 57)D(t) A(t) +K(t + 1). The money
market clearing condition is
P(t) = 1 5 [A(t) +K(t +1)]. (6)
The credit-market clearing condition is
A(t) = + K(C + 1) + B(t), (7)
8
Bond seigniorage,which is conceptually similar tocurrency seigniorage, isthe revenue the government
can earn from maintaining a real stock of outstanding debt when the real interest rate on its bonds is
lower than the output growth rate, See Miller and Sargent (1984).How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 11
where B(t) denotes the aggregate realmarket value of the government debt. These con-
ditions can be combined,producing
B(C) = A~(t)— 1 [A(C) +K(t + 1)]. (8)
1—57
Equation (5), the government budget constraint, involves B(t). Ifwe substitute equa-
tion (8) into the government budget constraint, then the right hand side of the resulting
equation can be written entirely as a function of R’~(t), R~c(t), and the parameters of the
model, given the solution of the agents’ decision problem:
G(t) = g [R’~(t), Rk(t), F,~]. (9)
If we take the level of government revenue G(t) = G to be determined exogenously by
the fiscal authority, and the rate of return on flat currency R~z(t)= R’~—theinverse of
the gross inflation rate—to be determined by the monetary authority, then equation (9)
is a complicated difference equation in the total returns to capital R~c(t).Steady state
perfect foresight equilibria are sequences {Rd(t)}‘°ec that solve equation (9) and have
the property that Rd(t) = Rh Vt. We will study equilibria ofthis type. The total revenue
Laffer curve defined by equation (9) will normally produce two such equilibria in the
quantitative caseswe study. In this paper, we will confine ourselves to studyingequilibria
on the left side of the Laffer curve—the side along which increasing the rate of inflation
produces lower real rates of return on all assets. We think this is the relevant case for
industrialized economies.9
It is possiblefor the government revenue setting C to be inconsistent with the settings
of the tax parameters and the inflation rate, in which case equation (9) will have no
solution. When we try to fit the model to the data, we will want to solve both the
agents’ decision problem and equation (9) repeatedly for a wide variety of parameter
values. For this reason we take a slightly different approach to using equation (9). We
leave Rd fixed, but we allow the amount of government revenue G(C) to be endogenous.
We then lix a second real interest rate, Rb, by matching its value to the data, and let
the elements of the parameter vectors F and L~determine the rest of the interest rate
structure. This approach ensures that equation (9) always has a solution. Of course, the
value of G(t) produced may not be very consistent with the data, but we will make the
ratio of government consumption to output one of the targets of our system. Later in the
paper, when we report welfare comparisons across steady state equilibria with different
9
The other equilibrium seems less promising empirically. For most of the quantitative economies we
study, it involves counterfactuallyhigh rates of return to government debt, a much larger (five-fold inour
baseline case) stock of bonds relative to GDP, and implies that higher inflation raises the real rates of
return on bonds and capital when government spending is held constant. For recent empirical evidence
on related questions, see Weber (1994).How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 12
inflationrat~we holdthe ratio of C to total output fixed at a baseline level,because in
those calcula.~ons we will want to hold fiscal policy constant.
In any steady state equilibrium the capital-labor ratio grows at gross rate )~, as does
the real wage. The levels of all real aggregates—such as real output, asset demand, the
capital stock, and real balances—grow at gross rate A~.The steady states we study are
quantity-theoretic in the sense that the rate of money growth dictates the inflation rate
through a standard quantity theory equation.
3. CONFRONTING THE DATA
3.1. Strategy. Our goal is to find a plausible parameterization ofthe model that can
produce a convincing match to the data. We divide theparameter set into two parts. The
first is afixed parameter vector F, whichwe willset element by element based on available
data. The second is our deepparametervector i.~,whose elements we will estimate jointly
based on the data.
3.2. The fixed parameter vector. The fixed parameter vector is given by
F = , 12* )~,~‘, Rh, Ri’,rz] . (10)
We set m~,the retirement age, to agent age 44 (figurative age 65). Based on postwar
U.S. averages, we set the gross rate of technological change at )~ = 1.015, the gross rate
of labor force growth at ~ = 1.017, the gross real rate of return to currency holding at
Rd = 0.9615 (implying a 4 percent inflation rate), and the before-tax gross rate ofreturn
on bonds at Rb = 1.01. Our estimate of the average after-tax gross real return on federal
government bonds is R’~’”= 1.10 We use this information and the equilibrium relationship
between Rb and R~to set r~ = 0.2. We set the productivity proffle according to data
from Hansen (1993).”
3.3. The deep parameter vector.
Overview. The deep parameter vector for our model has elements 6,~,i = 1, ..., 9.
Forthese parameters, much less is known in the abstract. However, stationary equilibria
of our model willhave manyendogenouslygenerated implications forobservable quantities
‘°Weconstructed this estimate using marginal taxratedata providedby JosephPeek ofBostonCollege.
We thank him for his cooperation.
11
The Hansen data is collected from samples taken in 1979 and 1987. The data separate males from
females. We average thedata from the two years, and we also average thedata across males and females
using weights of 0.6 and 0.4. The resulting profile is a step function, because the data are collected for
age groupings, Wefit a fifth-order polynomial to this step function. This yieldsthe smooth profile ej..20







for i = 21,..., 76, with the vectorofcoefficients m =
0.613, —0.0274, 0.0063, —0.717 x iO~,0.314 x 10’~1.This profile peaks at agent age 28 (figurative age
48), when productivity is about 1.6 times its level at agent age 1 (figurative age 21). Productivity inthe
final year of life is virtually the same as in the first year of life.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 13
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Table 1. Targets on observable quantities.
Observable
Quantity Thrget Range Source
K/Y 3.32 [2.32,4.32] G.oley-Prescott (1994).
I/K 0.076 [0.066,0.086] Cooley-Prescott (1994).
B/Y 0.47 [0.255,0.686] U.S. data, 1959-94.
icg 0.015 [0.01,0.03] Laitner (1992).
alt 0.154 10.075,0.33] Authors’ calculations.
Im/Y 0.06 [0.05,0.07] Dfaz-Giménez, et al., (1992).
H/Y 0.0592 [0.041,0.078] U.S.data, 1959-94.
C/V 0.151 [0.121,0.18] U.S. data, 1959-94.
Tk’/G 0.119 [0.036,0.201] U.S. data, 1959-94.
Table 1: Nine targets on observable quantities. U.S. data source: 1996 Economic Report of the
President.
which can be estimated from the data. We choose a set of nine target quantities of this
type, on the principle ofthe same number of targets and parameters. The map from the
deep parameters to the targets describes a rugged surface in the nine dimensional space
of endogenous outcomes. For this reason, we employ a genetic algorithmto find abest fit
vector ~ based on a criterion defined over the space of target quantities. We now turn to
a detailed description of this procedure.
Targets onobservable quantities. The observable quantities we target are listed
in Table 1. Most of the target values are established estimates of postwar averages, so
we will not discuss them in much detail. The estimates of the average capital-output
ratio K/ Y and the average investment-capital ratio I/K are due to Cooleyand Prescott
(1994). These estimates are based on a broad definition ofcapital that includes consumer
durables and government capital. We target the equilibrium bonds to output ratio B/V
at the average value of the ratio of gross federal debt to output in postwar data. The
money-output ratio, H/Y, is the average ratio ofthe monetary baseto output in postwar
data. The average size of the financial intermediation sector, Im/Y, is targeted based on
the data presented in Figure 1.
Laitner (1992) has argued that, on average, individual consumption growth rates are
not too different from the aggregate consumption growth rate. Consequently, we set the
target foricg, an individual’s lifetimeconsumption growthrate, at 0.015, which isthe rate
oftechnological progress (from F) and thus the net rate of aggregate consumption growth
per capita. In overlapping generations models the lifetime consumption growth rate can
be very different from the aggregate consumption growth rate, so this target imposes a
significant constraint onour parameter choices. On the individual level we also target alt,How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 14
the average sharQof household time devoted to the labor market.’2
We view the government in the model as a consolidated federal, state and local entity.
We target G/Y, the ratio of government expenditures to output, at the average value of
consolidated government revenue, net of transfers and government investment, relative
to GDP. In the model, the revenues of the government come from five sources: taxes on
labor income, individual interest income, and corporate profits, plus currency and bond
seignorage. The personal interest income tax rate is an element of F. The levels of
currencyand bond seignorage wifi be determined by the interest rates 1?tm and Rb, which
are part of F, and by the ratios of money and bonds to output, both of which we have
targeted. Wetarget Tk/G, theratio of corporate profits tax revenues to total government
expenditures, to match the average value of this ratio in postwar data.
We also define plausible ranges around the targets as given in Table 1. The target
ranges will affect the operation ofour algorithm, but final outcomes will be very close to
the targets listed.
Nonlinear optimization. We use a genetic algorithm to learn about the irregular
nonlinear map between i~and the targets.’3 Given a candidate vectorj at algorithm
time s, E~.j
3
,we can calculate the solution to the agents’ decision problem, and based on
that information, we can find the implied steady state equilibrium values for the targets
associated with candidate vector j. We define a fitness criterion for a candidate vector
~ based on deviations of these implied values from targets. We use a geneticalgorithm
with real-valued coding, and operators providing tournament reproduction, three types
of crossover, and non-uniform mutation, as explained below. Because our non-uniform
mutation procedure slowly reduces the mutation rate to zero by time T, separate genetic
algorithm searches can yield different best fitcandidate vectors ~. Weconduct ten such
searches and report the best fit vectors.
Webegin by defininga fitness criterion across the nine targetsofour system. Wewant
to consider a criterion on the order of sum of squared deviations from target, but we also
want the genetic algorithm to consider the factthat some targets are tighter than others
in that the plausible deviation from them is smaller. Accordingly, we think of the target
ranges as defining the space of plausible outcomes, and we design our fitness criterion
to penalize candidate vectorsE~8more severely if they deliver values outside the target
range. This will prevent thegenetic algorithm fromspending alot oftime searching areas
of the parameter space which are good on many dimensions but bad on a few dimensions.
12
This is theauthors’ calculation based on a 24 hour day, a five dayworkweek, ten vacation days, ten
holidays and a7 0percent labor force participation rate.
‘
3
1t would take us too far astray to discuss the principles of genetic algorithms here in great detail.
For an introduction, as well as detailed discussion of the real-valued approach we use and the associated
genetic operators, see Michalewicz (1994).How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 15
We assign penalty points basedon deviations from target on each dimension. The penalty
points are assigned linearly up to the boundary of thetarget, such that a candidate vector
is penalizedone point if a particular valueis at the boundary ofthe target range. Outside
the target range, an appropriately scaledquadratic penalty in the difference between the
value and target boundary is added to the linear penalty. If wedenote implied values ofa
candidate vector L~j3 by
0~
js,target values by 8~, and upper and lower target bounds by




(O~—6~)/(~—O~) + (9~)2/~(~9*) if 0.. >~. —
= ~ ~ (12)
(0~ — 0~~) /(0~ —~ +~ — 9)2 ~~— 9~) if 0~<O~
This definition meansthat the better fitvectors will have lower fitness values, and a vector
that delivers an exact fit on all targets will havea fitness of zero.
The geneticalgorithm is an iterative directed search procedure acting on a population
ofj candidate vectors at algorithm time s. At time s, the fitness of all candidate vectors
in the population is calculated. To obtain the next set of candidate vectors, t~j
5~
,we
apply genetic operators. The first operator is tournament reproduction. Weselect two
vectors at random with replacement from the time s population. The vector with the
better fitness value is copied into the time s+ 1 population. This operator is repeated
enough times to produce a time s + 1 population equal in size to the time .s population.
Reproduction provides most of the evolutionary pressure in the search algorithm, but
we need other operators to allow the system to experiment with new, untried candidate
vectors. Crossover and mutation provide the experimentation, and operate on the time
s + 1 population before the fitness values for that population are calculated.
To implement our crossover operators, we consider the time s + 1 population two
vectors,j andj+1, at atime, and we implement the crossover operator with probability
pC• If crossover is to be performed on the two vectors, we use one of three methods with
equal probability. In single-point crossover, we choosea random integer 1cross E [1, ..., 9]
and swapthe elements ofi~j,~+i and ~ wherei ~ Inarithmetic crossover,we
choose a random real a E [0,1] and create post-crossover vectors a.A~j,5÷, +(1—a)~j+,,5+,
and (1 — a)~~,5+i + a~j+,,s+l. In shuffle crossover, we exchange elements of L~ and
L~j+i,sbased on draws from a binomial distribution, such that if the i’~”~ draw is unity,
the ~th elements are swapped, otherwise the ~ elements are not swapped. Each ofHow Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 16
these operators has been shown to havestrengths in the artificial intelligence literature in
certain types of diffi~iiltsearch problems, and we use them all here in order to improve
the prospects for success.
We implement a non-uniform mutation operator that makes use of upper and lower
bounds, ~ and~, respectively,onthe elementsofa candidate vector~ Thisoperator
is implemented with probability ptm on element
6
ij,s+1. If mutation is to be performed on
the element, we choose a pair of random reals r1,r2 U [0,1]. The new, perturbed value
ofthe element is then set according to





s1,s+1 — (öij,s+1 —
5
j) ifri < .5,
where b is a parameter. With this mutation operator, the probability of choosing a new
element far from the existing element diminishes as algorithm time s —. T, where T is
the maximum algorithm time, This operator is especially useful in allowing the genetic
algorithmtomore intensivelysample in theneighborhood ofthealgorithm time sestimate
of the best fit vector in the latter stages of the search.
We conducted ten genetic algorithm searches in order to identify a best fit deep pa-
rameter vectorL~according to our set of targets defined in Table i.’~The results are
reported in Table 2.
We find that the algorithm time T population of parameter vectors .A.~provide a
close fit on our target data. The only quantitatively significant discrepancies from targets
occur on individual consumptiongrowth and individual time devoted to market, and then
the implied values are typically only .2 to .35 of a penalty point from target, meaning
that implied values on these dimensions lie away from the target only 20 to 35 percent
of the distance between the target and a target bound. We found little or no variation
among individual parameters within algorithm time s = T populations. Across searches,
wefound some variance, almostall ofit in thepreferenceparameters. The estimates ofthe
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, for instance, ranged from a low of .114 to a high
of .185. Search number 5 provided the best overall fit, and we now turn to a discussion
~
4
We set the parameters in the genetic algorithm, {popvlation, p’~,p, T, b}, as {30, .95, .11, 1000,
2} based on standards in the artificial intelligence literature. In our final search, we set T = 2500,
but we did not observe a commensurate inprovement in performance, and so we did not pursue higher
values ofT any further. Weset the bounds onelements Sj, i = 1,..., 9, according to [—0.3,0.11, [1.1,40],
[0.075,0.33], [0.25,0.4], [0.025,0.075], [0.01,0.04], [0.01,0.081, [0.01,0.4], [0.01,0.25]. This amounts to a
set ofconstraints on thesearch to values that are typically viewed aseconomically plausible. We intialize
the system by choosing elements of an initial population ofvectors L~ randomly from uniform intervals
defined by these bounds.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 17
Table 2. Results of nonlinear optimization.




1 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.78
2 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69
3 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57
4 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.29 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.65
5 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30
6 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.31 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.76
7 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.29 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61
8 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78
9 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.91
10 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.62
Table 2: The fit to the data. The entries are deviations from target, by target and total, in
penalty points, for each ofthe ten searches we conducted. Columns 2 through 10 are averages
across algorithm time s = T populations. Within algorithm time s = T populations, we found
little or no variation across fitness components.
of the economy described by the associated best fit deep parameter vector.’5
4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BASELINE ECONOMY
4.1. A quantitative match to the data. Our baseline economy has the features
summarized in Table 3. The main features of the artificial economy match the data on
the dimensions we have selected. The average growth rate of household consumption
over the lifetime is a little higher than our target, but this is also the target on which
we have the least evidence. In including this target, we were mainly concerned that
we avoid ending up with a baseline economy in which individual consumption growth
was considerably different from the aggregate consumption growth rate, as can and has
happened in research on general equilibrium life cycle models, and which would probably
be viewed as adefect ofthe model. Wethink we have succeeded on this goal, even though
the fit is not exact.
The effective rate of time preference is —0.0067, which is closeto the —0.0098 point
estimate that can be calculated from Hurd’s (1989, p. 801) estimates of our ö~and
52 parameters. Similar values have been used by Rios-Rull (1994) and others. The
baseline economy has an elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of0.151, and thus
a coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) of 6.6.16 These values are well within
15
For search number 5, the average value of the algorithm time s = T population of candidate vec-
tors is given by {—.223, 37.4, .154, .26, .0439, .018, .0169, .11, .o742}. The economic interpretation is
summarized in Table 3. t6
WhiIe the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is an important parameter in our model, risk aver-
sion is not relevant in our nonstochastic framework. We mention the CRRA only because we want to
II
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Table 3. Baseline steady state characteristics.
Aggregate performance Model Target
Real output growth A~ç1’ 1.032 fixed
Inflation 1/R~L 1.04 fixed
Technological progress A 1.015 fIxed
Labor force growth i,b 1.017 fixed
Preferences
Effective rate oftime preference -0.0067 open
CRRA ii 6.6 open
EIS a 0.151 open
Individual consumption growth icg 0.0188 0.015
Lifetime average agent time devoted to labor alt 0 1539 0 154
Asset holdings
Capital-output ratio K/Y 3.33 3.32
Bonds-output ratio B/Y 0.48 0.47
Money-output ratio H/Y 00591 00592
Technology
Capital share 0.26 open
Depreciation rate 0.0439 open
Investment-capital ratio I/K 0.0762 0.076
Intermediation
Intermediation-output ratio Im/Y 0.0599 0.06
Government size
Government-output ratio G/Y 0.151 0.151
Revenue from firms TIC/G 0.119 0.119
Govermnent revenue sources
Household labor tax TU/Y 0.081 open
Household interest tax r/Y 0.037 open
Corporate profits tax Tk/Y 0.018 open





R4’~ R~,R~ Rd, ~b R~ R~, R~ R’~ RIC
Target fixed fixed fixed open open open open
Real 0.9615 1.0003 1.0100 1.0108 1.0288 1.0342 1.0781
Nominal 1.0000 1.0403 1.0504 1.0513 1.0700 1.0756 1.1213
Table 3: Baseline steady state characteristics. Our endogenous quantities are close to target on
theninedimensions we consider. Theterm “fixed” in a target entry means we set these quantities
directly based on U.S. data. The term “open” in a target entry means we did not fix or target
these quantities directly.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 19
conventional ranges, and are consistent with evidence presented by Hall (1.988). The
question of the amount of curvature in preferences is controversial, however. Attanasio
and Weber (1995), for example, report a point estimate for the EIS of 0.56. Other
researchers have used high coefficients of relative risk aversion in an effort to explain
rate of return differentials. Campbell and Cochrane (1994), for instance, use a local risk
aversion coefficient of 48.4 in their model with habit formation preferences. Later in
this paper, when we obtain estimates of the welfare cost of inflation, we will consider
economies with both higher and lower EIS values. We will show that within the range
defined by these alternative estimates, the value of EIS is qualitatively unimportant to
our conclusions concerning the size of the cost of inflation: our estimates of the cost will
always be an order of magnitude larger than those in the existing literature.’7
Since our model has rate of return differentials, we can compare them to the data.
In our model the counterpart to the return on a basket of stocks isRk~, since corporate
profits taxes are deducted from firms’ earnings before they pay dividends, and the capital
gains on firms’ stock presumably reflects market adjustments for depreciation. The equity
premium comparable to the literature in our model is then R~less the before-tax return
to bonds, Rb, which is 188 basis points in our baseline equilibrium. In this differential, 8
basis points are due to money demand and the remaining 180 basis points are due to the
cost of financial intermediation. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1996, Table 8.1) report
that the comparable equity premium in the U.S.data, measured as an average ofannual
excess returns over a long time horizon, is 410 basis points with an approximate 95%
confidence band of 164,756]. Our baselineequity premium thus accounts for about half of
the differential based on the point estimate but is well within the 95% confidence band.
In an influential paper, Abel, et al., (1989) noted two stylized facts about the U.S.
economy that are seemingly contradictory and would be difficult to reconcile in general
equilibrium models. The first fact is that real rates of return on short-term government
debt are consistently lower thanoutput growth rates. The second factis that gross capital
income has consistently exceeded gross investment. Our baseline steady state reconciles
theseobservations. Byconstruction, thissteady state matcheslong-run averagesfromU.S.
data on the realpretax rate of returnon short-term government debt and the realoutput
growth rate. To investigate the second stylized fact, we can use the features ofour steady
state to reconstruct the calculation that Abel, et al. (1989) performed using U.S. data.
provide intuition forthe model with aggregate uncertainty. However, adding uncertainty would have little
impact onthe steadystate comparisons conducted inthis paper—the same sorts ofcomparisons that are
studied in most papers in the literature on the welfare cost ofinflation.
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Our capital share estimate is consistent with most standard interpretations of the national income
and product accounts. However, Cooley and Prescott (1994) use an estimate of0.4. We will examine an
alternative economy that has this capital share value, and we will show that the particular value we use
is not essential to our argument.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 20
In our model, the ratio of gross investment to output is(K(t+1) —K(t) + 55K(t))/Y(t),
which is (A~b —1+ 65)(K/Y) ina steady state. Our baseline value of this ratio is 0.253, a
value that is consistent with calculations presented by Cooley and Prescott (1994). The
ratio ofgross capital incometo output in our modelis (Rc(t) —1)K(t)/Y(t), which is 0.26,
and thus exceeds our baseline ratio of investment to output.’8 The key to the ability of
our model to reconcile these two stylized facts is that the model includes intermediation
costs that are calibrated to duplicate theobservedsize of theU.S. financialservices sector.
Total capital income in our model is relatively high because it includes income spent on
theseservices, whilethe returns households receiveon safeassets are relatively lowbecause
the cost of providing these services has been deducted.
Our baseline steady state matches postwar-U.S. data on many other dimensions, but
a complete discussion of its features would take us too far astray from the question at
hand.
4.2. Optimality. There is a respecification of our baseline model that has a Pareto
optimal steady state. In this respecification, the direct tax rates are set at zero. The
monetary authority sets the inflation rate according to the Friedman rule: the net nom-
inal interest rate is zero, and the real rates of return on both currency and government
bonds are equalto the output growth rate. If government expenditures are positive, they
are financed through lump-sum taxation. This respecification is conceptually interest-
ing because we can view our baseline steady state as a distorted version of the Pareto
optimum, where the distortions are due to direct proportional taxes and inflation. Unfor-
tunately, the Pareto optimum is not quantitatively interesting because it requires either
that government expenditures are set at zeroor that they are financed through lump-sum
taxation. Neither of these alternatives is empirically plausible. As a result, the Pareto
optimum cannot provide the basis for a useful analysis of the welfare cost of inflation.
Our alternative approach to calculating the welfare cost of inflation takes the level of
government expenditures, the structure of the direct tax system and the structure of the
intermediation system as given. To determine thewelfarecost ofinflation, we compare the
level of welfare associated with a benchmark inflation rate to the welfarelevels associated
with feasible alternative inflation rates. We now turn to calculations of this type.
‘8Although our baseline ~.teady state thus matches thesecond stylized fact ina qualitative sense, Abel,
etal. (1989) obtained amuchlower estimate ofthe ratioof investment to ouput. The reasonforthis isthat
in performingtheircalculations they useddata on grossinvestment in private business capital, asopposed
to the broader concept ofcapital used by Cooley and Prescott (1994), which includes government capital
and consumer durables. Using this narrower concept, the gross investment figure in the data declines to
0.16, and so the comparison ends up as 0.16 versus 0.26.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 21
5. THE WELFARE COST OF INFLATION
5.1. Welfare comparisons. We compare two economies that share exactly the same
environment, preferences and technology, including common values of all parameters ex-
cept Rh. One economy has a higher inflation rate (a lower value of Rh) than the other,
and a typical agent in the high inflation economy will be worse off, in a welfare sense,
than a typical agent in the low inflation economy. We want to calculate the amount
of consumption-good compensation necessary, at each date, to make the agents in the
high-inflation economy indifferent between staying inthat economy or moving to the low-
inflation economy. This measure of the welfare cost of inflation is conceptually similar to
measures used by Cooley and Hansen(1989) and others. However, theagent heterogeneity
in our model makes our calculations slightly more complicated.
To calculate the welfare cost of a particular rate of inflation relative to a benchmark
rate of inflation, we first calculate the lifetime utility of a representative member of an
arbitrary generation t in the steady state associated with the benchmark inflation rate.
Next, we solve themodel fornewsteady state associated withtheinflation rate whose cost
we are calculating, and we save the consumption and leisure choices of a representative
member of the same generation t in that steady state. We then fix the leisure choices of
these agents and imagine giving them compensation, in units of the consumption good,
until they are indifferent between the two steady states. Wedistribute the compensation
as follows. Let x~(t)denote the amount ofcompensation given to amember ofgeneration
t at date t. We allow thisvalueto grow at gross rate A peryear overthese agents’ lifetimes,
sothat ~t(t + i) = A~x~(t), i = 1, ... , n — 1. We then determine the value x~(t)that will
restore the members of generation t to their original level of utility.
Eachmember of generation t — k will receivethe same amount of date t compensation
as each member of generation t: that is, xt..k(t) = x~(t).The reason for this is that these
agents are in the k+lst year of their lives, which tends to increase their compensation
by a factor of A~c,but they are also from the kth previous generation, so they are poorer
over their lifetimes by a factor of Ak and thus need proportionally less compensation to
reach to their original level of utility. If the population of generation t is normalized to
unity then the total compensation that must be given to all the agents alive at date t is
>~, x~(t)/~b’’.Our measure of the welfare cost of inflation is the ratio of this amount
to total date t real output in the steady state associated with the benchmark inflation
rate.
5.2. Results.
Welfare cost relative to baseline cases. We will report the welfare cost of infla-
tionrelative toabenchmark inflationrate offour percent, andalso relative toabenchmarkHow Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 22
Figure 2. The welfare costofinflation.
Relativetobaseline casesoffour percent andzeroinflation.
A Relative toabaseline economy with4 percentinflation.
o Relative toabaseline economy with zero inflation.
Welfarecost is ctunpensatinp consumption asa fractionofbaseline realoutput.
Figure 2: The welfare cost of a percentage point on the inflationrate is a distortion which has
a size of at least a percentage point of real output. The size of the distortion is approximately
linear in the inflation rate for the range considered in the figure.
inflation rate ofzero percent. These results, which constitute our main findings, are sum-
marized in Figure 2. The triangles in the figure give the welfare cost of the indicated
inflation ratesrelative toa reference inflation rate offour percent per year. Since an infla-
tion rateoffour percent yields no cost or benefit, the triangleat the point (4,0) represents
our baseline steady state. Lower inflation rates yield welfare benefits to agents relative
to the reference inflation rate, sothe welfare cost is negative moving left from the point
(4,0). Higher rates of inflation impose higher welfare costs on agents, so the line formed
by the triangles is upward-sloping. As the inflation rate increases, the rate of increase in
the welfare cost is astoundingly high. Over the range of inflation rates considered, a one
percent increase in the annual inflation rate increases the welfare cost ofinflation by more
than one percent of real output per year. These costs are an order of magnitude larger
2 4681(3 12 14
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than comparable estimates from the previous literature)-9
There are no triangles in the figure for inflation rates of less than 2.5 percent. The
reason for this is that once inflation moves below this level, we cannot hold G/Y con-
stant without adjusting some of the direct tax rates in the model. We use two different
methods to address this situation. The simplest method involves modifying our baseline
steady state by holding all the parameters of the model except the inflation rate fixed
and accepting whatever level ofgovernment expenditures is consistent with a benchmark
inflation rate of zero. We can then calculate the welfare cost ofinflation relative to a zero
inflation steady state.20 The results of these calculations are indicated by the boxes in
Figure 2. Again, over the range of inflation rates considered the increase in the welfare
cost as inflation rises is better than one percent of realoutput per percent increase in the
inflation rate. Wethink this isthe best comparison ofour results to those in the previous
literature, which abstracts from the issue of the level of government revenue produced
by calibrated tax rates. It illustrates the fact that at low rates of inflation, the size of
the marginal distortion from inflation remains large. In particular, based on Figure 2
one would not advise an economy enjoying price stability to allow the inflation rate to
increase.
The steady state at zero inflation inherits most of the quantitative properties of the
steady state at four percent inflation, so we do not report these properties here. The
principal exception is government revenue as a fraction of real output, which is about
11 percent in the zero inflation case versus 15.1 percent in the baseline case. Table 4
summarizes recent comparable estimates ofthe welfare cost ofinflation in the literature.2’
Confronting the revenue shortage directly. A second way to confront the loss
of revenue when inflation is lowered is to directly raise other taxes to make up for lost
revenue. Using this approach, we lose comparability to the situation considered by most
19
Some of the data points from Figure 2 are listed in the following table:
Inflation 0 1 2~ 3 4 5 7~ 10 14
Base 0 0 1.37 3.33 3.97 5.22 6.46 9.48 12.42 17.03
Base 4 — — —2.26 —1.48 0 1.29 4.23 6.99 11.98
20At the cost of some complications, we could use a lower, Friedman-rule rateofinflation—a deflation
rate equal tothe outputgrowth rate—as a benchmark rate without changing our qualitative conclusions.
However, zero inflation has often been used as a benchmark in the literature. 2mOne interpretation of Lather and Schreft (1996) would put the welfare cost of10 percent versuszero
inflation at a fairly large 4.27 percent ofoutput. Other interpretations, however, are consistent with the
lower cost estimates reported in the papers listed in the Table. Lather and Sthreft (1996) emphasize
resource-costly credit and the impact of inflation on real returns. Feldstein (1996) estimates that a two
percent reduction in inflation would produce a welfare gain ofabout one percent ofGDP, which is about
halfthe magnitude of the gains we report. Feldstein’s analysis is similar to ours in emphasizing tax code
interaction, but hedoes not usegeneral equilibrium methodology. Abel (1996),commenting on Feldstein,
does compute a general equilibrium. The total effect is still less than halfour baseline effect, however.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 24
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Life cycle economy with
financial intermediation
10% vs. 0% 12.4 %
ii
Table 4: Some recent studiesofthe welfarecost ofinflation. Costsareexpressed as compensating
consumption necessaryto make agents indifferent between the two inflation regimes. The cost
calculated in this paper is an order of magnitude larger than those from the earlier literature.
of the other research considered in Table 4, but we perhaps gain some insight into the
problems of actualdisinflation from moderate levels. The government in the model funds
a portion of its activities with seignorage revenue and taxes on nominal quantities. These
revenue sources aregoing to be less lucrative for the government at lowerrates ofinflation,
and so, if the monetary authority moves inflation to less than 2.5 percent in our baseline
economy, either the government is going to have to spend less relative to output, or raise
taxes. Raising taxes to maintain revenue could in principle cause a larger distortion on
net when inflation is reduced. We consider a tax increase scenario in which all the lost
revenue is made up by increasing all tax rates equally in percentage point terms.22
Figure 3 illustrates how the need to raiseother distortionary taxes affects the welfare
benefits of disinflation from low inflation rates.23 In the figure, the welfare benefits from
further reductions in inflation decline markedly as the inflation rate is reduced below 2.5
percent. The total net welfare benefit achieved by moving from 2.5 percent inflation to
zero inflation is less than 0.2 percent of baseline real output. While this is still large by
the standards of thepapers listed in Table4, it is quite small by the standards established
22
An alternative tax increase scenario, in which revenue is made up only through increases in the tax
rate on labor income, produced similar results.
23
Some of thedata points from Figure 3 are listed inthe following table:
Inflation 0 1 1~ 2
Welfare cost —2.86 —2.80 —2.74 —2.67 —2.60
01
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Inflation rate,percent
ARevenue made up through equal percentage point increases in taxrates.
Welfare cost iscompensating consumption asapercentofbaselinereal Outpot.
Figure 3: Disinflation with distorting taxes. Declines in inflation froma baseline of four percent
reduce government revenue. At low inflation rates, direct tax rates must be increased in order
to maintain the baseline level of government spending relative to output. The marginal benefit
of lower inflation is accordingly smaller in this region.
in this paper. The bottom line of this analysis is that the welfare gains from lower
inflation can be largely offset by the welfare losses produced by more severe direct-tax
distortions. Thus, while our model indicates that there are largepotential welfare benefits
from movingto inflation rates lowerthan 2.5 percent, it also suggests that capturing these
benefits requires a degree of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities that is
not necessary when disinflating from higher levels of inflation.
A purely monetary welfare cost. Much of the literature on the welfare cost of
inflation has concentrated on ‘~purely monetary” welfare costs. In our analysis, however,
inflation produces several distortions that are not directly connected to money demand.
F1~oma policy perspective, we think our approach provides a useful contribution, since
the total distortion caused by inflation, taking other features of the economy as given, is
the crucial yardstick by which judgements must be made. In this section of the paper,
however, we would like to apportion our welfare cost estimates by source inorder to allow
easier comparisons to other studies and to provide intuition for our results.
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2 00 baseline 0.42 %
3 0 baseline 0 0.80%
40 baseline baseline 1.01 %
5 baseline 00 0.14%
6 baseline 0 baseline 0.77 %
7 baseline baseline 0 1.00 %
8 baseline baseline baseline 1.29 %
Table 5: Sources ofwelfarecost by type of distortion.
and in combination, leavingall other parameters set as in our baseline case and retaining
our baseline inflation rate of 4 percent. Each time we shut off a source of distortion the
government loses revenue, sothe baseline ratio ofgovernment revenue to output declines.
We hold the ratio of government revenue tooutput ratio fixed at this adjusted level and
report the welfare cost of increasing the inflation rate to 5 percent. This approach is
simple and illuminating, although we emphasize that the baseline steady states produced
by shutting offvarious sources of distortion wifi not match the data as well as the baseline
economy described in Table 3. Table 5 summarizes our findings. In the Table, an entry of
“baseline” indicates that a parameter has been left at its baseline value, while an entry of
zero indicates that the value ofa parameter has been set at zero for the given case. Case
8i sour baseline equilibrium.
Case 1 in Table 5 gives our estimate of the purely monetary welfare cost of inflation:
When intermediation costs and both capital income tax rates are set at zero, then a one
percentage point increase in the rate of inflation produces a welfare cost of only 0.08
percent of the baseline level of real output. This cost estimate is of the same order of
magnitude as the estimates from the previous literature that are summarized in Table 4.
Including the cost of financialintermediation has not influenced our estimates very much,
according to Table 5, which shows that that feature of our model is mainly useful in
helping to obtain a reasonable fit to the data. Table 5 also makes it deaf that including
taxes that are levied on nominal quantities—either interest income taxes or corporate
profits taxes—greatly increases the estimated welfarecost relative to the purely monetary
case. We conclude that abstracting from inflation’s interaction with the tax code would
give a misleading picture of the welfare cost of inflation in our model.How Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 27
A decomposition. In our model, an increase in the inflation rate reduces welfare
primarily because it reduces the steady state real rate of return on household assets. We
can gain insight into this effect by decomposing it into two parts. First, there is a direct
tax effect by which increases in inflation increase the effective tax rate on capital income.
In our model, this effect arises mainly because direct taxes on capital income are levied
on nominal rather than real income, and to a lesser extent because inflation increases the
cost to intermediaries of holding base money reserves. As a result of the direct tax effect,
inflation reduces the after-tax real rate of return associated with any before-tax real rate
of return.
But before-tax realrates ofreturn also fall in the face of higher inflation in our model.
This is the general equilibrium effect of an increase in the inflation rate. The general
equilibrium effect stems from the fact that any increase in the inflation rate increases
the amount of government revenue associated with each real interest rate. To see this,
consider the non-labor-tax (the tax on labor is levied on a real quantity) real revenue of
the government in steady state. The terms in the sum T’ +T’~ + C8 + B5 in steady state
can, according to our earlier discussion of the equilibria of the model, be written as
= [—.012 — .l82Rh + .l82RIr} [B + 1.05K],
= [—.003 — .074R’~+ .074Rk] [K],
C8
= [.969 — .969R’~}[.018K), (14)
B8
= [1.008 — .087Rh — .882R/cJ [B],
where we have used our baseline parameter values and rearranged in order to reduce
clutter.24 In these expressions, the first term in brackets is the real tax rate for a given
revenue source, and the second term in brackets is the tax base for that revenue source.
The aggregate levels of capital, K, and bonds, B, can also be written entirely as (compli-
cated) functions of Rh and R’~, a fact we want to keep in mind but do not explicitly note
in these expressions. If we consider a steady state with a higher level of inflation relative
to baseline(a lower value of R’~), then the tax rate portions of all these expressions will
increase. in our model, the levels of B and K will also change, even if R~cis held fixed,
because the realrates ofreturn intermediate between R~and R’~ will all fall when Rh
falls, since they are all essentially conve~ combinations of R’~ and ~ However, in our
baseline economy, these changes in asset demand are by themselves insufficient to offset
the direct increase in tax rates. Thus, government revenue from all of these sources will
increase. Since we want to maintain the ratio of government spending to output at a
constant, this cannot be a new steady state equilibrium. To create a new equilibrium,
24
1n producing these expressions, we have taken advantage ofthe fact that A is zero in our baseline
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Figure 4. A shifting Laffer curve
Baselineeconomy
Figure 4: Wheninflation rises,government revenue relative tooutput rises for any given interest
rate. Here, the curve labelled Li is the relevant portion of thetotal revenue Laffer curve for four
percent inflation, our baseline case, and L2 is the same curve for five percent inflation.
the before-tax real rate of return Rk fails and crowds in private credit. As Rk falls, the
expressions above show that the effective tax rates on capital income are reduced, which
helps to move the economy closer to an equilibrium. The effective tax rate in the bond
seignorage equation, however, is increasedfurther, and sharply. The crowding inofprivate
credit offsets this effect and allows the economy to reach an equilibrium by causing the
level of bonds to fall. In our quantitative comparisons of steady states with four versus
five percent inflation, real government revenues relative to output from capital income
taxes and base money seniorage rise with inflation, while bond seniorage revenues rela-
tive to output declinebecause of the fall in bonds. The fail in bonds is the key element
that allows the government budget constraint to be satisfied at the new, higher level of
inflation.25
The effect ofan increase in the inflation rate on the realafter-tax rate ofreturn facing
households is ifiustrated in Figure 4. The figure displays the relevant portions (the left
sides) of a pair of total revenue Laffer curves—curves that indicate the ratio of total
government revenue to output that is associated with each after-tax real interest rate on
deposits, with the inflation rate and all the direct tax rates held fixed. in the figure, the
curve labelled Li is the total revenue Laffer curve for our baseline inflation rate of four
25
Fora moredetailed analysis of this effect see Espinosaand Russell (1996). Their analysis is conducted
using a two-period overlapping generations model that does not include a direct tax system.
(1.995 0.99 0.995 1 1.(X)5 1.0! 1.015 1.02
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percent. This curve intersects a horizontal line representing the baseline G/Y ratio at
the baseline value of the real after-tax deposit rate. The curve labelled L2 is the total
revenue Laffer curve for an inflation rate of five percent, which is shifted up relative to
Li by the increase in government revenues produced by the increased inflation rate. This
curve intersects the baseline G/Y ratio at a new, lower real rate of return.
Wecan measure the relative sizesofthe general equilibrium effect and direct tax effect
by performing the following decomposition. Let us suppose that the fiscal authority in
our model attempts to offset the increase in government revenue produced by moving
from four to five percent inflation by reducing the only direct tax that is levied on a
real quantity, which is the tax on labor income. Suppose they reduce this tax ratejust
until the point where the total realreturn to capital is unchanged from the baseline, four
percent inflation case. Although the before-tax real return on capital is thus unchanged
by construction, after-tax real rates of return will be reduced because higher inflation
has increased the effective tax rate on capital income. In Figure 4, this amounts to
drawing a third total revenue Laffer curve intermediate between Li and L2, a curve we
haveomitted in the figure only to reduce clutter, and determines a third equilibrium real
after-tax return to deposits intermediate between the two in the figure. This calculation
effectively decomposes the total effect of higher inflation on the real after-tax rate of
return to deposits into (i) the general equilibrium effect, the reduction in real returns
that comes from a shift up in the total revenue Laffer curve that occurs because of a tax
increase, and (2) the direct tax effect, the change in the shape of the total revenue Laffer
curve that occurs because an increase in inflation directly increases effective tax rates on
nominal quantities in the model.
This decomposition yields the following important finding: in our baseline economy,
the general equilibrium component of the welfare cost of inflation is about 3~times
larger than the direct tax component. Of the total welfare cost offive versus four percent
inflation of1.29 percent reported above, our decomposition has it as a general equilibrium
effect of about 1.01 percent and a direct tax effect of about .28 percent. Both effects are
important—our estimate of the cost from the direct tax effect aloneis roughly three times
larger than the typical total welfare cost estimate in the literature. However, the general
equilibrium effect is clearly the dominant one. This dominance is also indicated in Table
6, which reports the effects of a one percent increase in inflation on the entire structure
of real interest rates in our baseline case.
Alternative parameterizations. In this subsection, we report the results from a
few alternative parameterizations ofour baseline economy. Some economists might argue
that we have too much curvature in our preference map—an objection that raises theHow Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 30
Table 6. General equilibrium and direct tax effects. 1]
Rh R~ R~’ R~ R”° R~ Rk
Baseline 0.9615 1.0003 1.0100 1.0108 i.0288 1.0342 1.0781
Direct tax effect 0.9524 0.9978 1.0092 i.OlOi 1.0281 1.0342 1.0781
GE effect 0.9524 0.9950 1.0057 1.0066 1.0246 1.0304 1.0743
Table 6: Direct tax and general equilibrium effects for a movement from four to five percent
inflation. The total effect is the difference from the first to the third line, and the general
equilibrium effect is the difference between the second and third lines. The change in the after-
taxrealreturnto bonds is approximatelysplit between the two effects, but thegeneral equilibrium
effect has a larger impact on the rest ofthe return structure.
question of whether fairly strong resistance to intertemporal substitution is an important
source ofour findings. In fact, ourresults dodisplay somesensitivity to different intertem-
poral substitution elasticities. Wecan illustrate this sensitivity by resetting the curvature
parameter ~2 toa valuethat produces an EIS of .56, apoint estimatedue to Attanasio and
Weber (1995).26 The welfare cost offiveversus four percent inflation is then 0.89 percent
of the baseline level of real output. While this cost estimate is lower than our baseline
estimateof 1.29 percent, it remains large by the standards of the previous literature. This
alternative baseline steady state does not match the data very well on the dimensions we
used in Table 3.
Other economists might argue that more curvature in the preference map might be
necessary in order to attribute the observed equity premium to the pricing ofrisk. Camp-
bell and Cochrane (i994) use amodel with a local relative risk aversion coefficient of 48.4
to duplicate the equity premium. While this figure is not strictly comparable to ours be-
cause the authors use habit formation preferences, the idea isjust to consider a high risk
aversion case. With a CRRA of 48.4 (an EIS of 0.021), the implied welfare cost of a one
percent increase in the inflation rate is 1.46 percent of the baseline level of real output,
which is larger than our preferred estimate. This alternative steady state matches our
targets about as closely as our baseline parametrization.
Finally, our best fit capital share parameter is lower than values sometimes used in
the literature. Cooley and Prescott (1994) recommend a value of 0.4 for this parameter.
Ifwe make thisalteration to our baseline case, the welfare cost of five versus four percent
inflation falls to 0.67 percent of the baseline levelofrealoutput, which is smaller than our
preferredestimate but not enough to change our qualitative conclusions. This alternative
baseline steady state is not, however, a good match for the data.
26
When we makethis alteration and theone below, we aiso change 6~in a way that keeps the effective
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5.3. A caution on interpretation. We have followed most of the previous litera-
ture on thewelfare cost of inflationby confining our analysis to steady state comparisons.
Conducting comparisons of this sort is generally regarded as a plausible strategy for ob-
taining order-of-magnitude estimates of the welfare cost of inflation in actual economies.
Of course, these comparisons involve permanent and perfectly credible changes in mone-
tary policy, and policy changesofthis type havenot actually been observed in thepostwar
U.S. A more complete analysis of the welfare implications of changes in inflation would
also study costs (or benefits) incurred during the transition path from one steady state
to another. Our preliminary work on this question indicates that in our model these
transitions take significant amounts of time. Thus, our results should not be interpreted
as suggesting that welfare gains from lower inflation can be realized overnight, and it is
conceivable that a transition analysis might alter someofour basic findings.
We can, however, cite one interesting piece of evidence which suggests that this prob-
ably would not be the case. Suppose we imagine that a shift from the old steady state
to a new steady state occurs instantly at some date T. We can use our utility function
to conduct across-steady-state comparisons of the remaining welfare of the members of
generations T, T — 1, T — 2, ... ,T — 54—that is, of cohorts of agents with 55, 54, ... , i
years left to live at dateT—from date T to theend of their lives. In our baseline economy,
the remaining welfare of the members of each of these cohorts is higher ina steady state
with 3 percent inflation than in the baseline steady state with 4 percent inflation. Thus,
acrosssteady states all age cohorts benefit from lower inflation. Consequently, if the tran-
sition path between the steady states is close to linear then the benefits of a disinflation
undertaken at adate T should start accruing immediately to all members of the society.
We recognize that our assumptions about the tax system are at best a crude approx-
imation of the complex and nonlinear array of taxes imposed by U.S. federal, state and
localgovernments. Wehaveadopted the conservative approach of allowinga largefraction
of government expenditures to be financed by a tax on real labor income — a tax whose
effective rate does not depend on the rate of inflation. This decision probably causes us
to understate the historical welfare cost of inflation: actual income taxes are levied on
nominal income in a progressive manner, and prior to the i980s “bracket creep” allowed
increases in inflation to increaseboth effective labor income tax rates and government Ia-
bor income tax revenues. We also ignore the historical effect of “bracket creep” on income
from interest and capital gains. (In the case of capital gains, the tax reforms of the i980s
reduced this effect but did not eliminate it entirely.) On the other hand, our assumption
that the corporate profits tax acts analogously to the interest income tax as a tax on
nominal returns to capital is at least partly counterfactual: under the U.S. tax system,
the effective corporate profits tax rate is not directly increased by inflation. However, weHow Costly is Sustained Low Inflation for the U.S. Economy? 32
think this assumption is reasonable, as a first approximation, for two reasons. First, our
corporate profits tax is intended partly as a proxy for a tax on capital gains, which is
absent from our model: the effective tax rate on capital gains does increase with higher
inflation. Second,the fact that the U.S. tax system uses historic cost depreciation allows
inflation to increase the effective tax rate on corporate profits indirectly, by reducingthe
real value of depreciation allowances,27
Our model also abstractsfrom another important feature oftheU.S. taxsystem, which
is that households may deduct mortgage interest payments (and before the 1980s, other
interest payments) from their taxable incomes. But our tax assumptions account for
this effect by taxing households on their net interest income. In our general equilibrium
environment, the net asset position of the households is essentially the capital stock of
the economy. Similarly, our model does not distinguish returns paid by firms as dividends
from returns paid as interest: under the U.S. tax system, firms are taxed on the former
but not the latter. As a result, it may seem that we are overstating the extent of double
taxation ofcapital. Weaddress this problem by choosinga relatively low corporate profits
tax rate—a rate that allows us to duplicate the observed ratio of corporate profits tax
revenue to government expenditures in our baseline equilibrium.
In sum, we think our tax assumptions provide an approximation of the U.S. tax sys-
tem that is adequate for our purposes. However, further research on the nature of the
interaction between inflation and the tax code in general equilibrium models is certainly
warranted.
6. CoNcLuDING REMARKS
In this paper, we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to estimate the welfare cost
of inflation in the U.S. economy. Our analysis is based on the hypothesis that one of
the principal costs of inflation is its tendency to reduce real rates of return—a view that
is often expressed in both policy circles and academic discussions. According to our
estimates, the welfare cost of inflation is far larger than most of the literature to date
has indicated. However, our estimate of the purely monetary component of the welfare
cost—the component studied in most previous work on this topic—is of the same order
of magnitude as previous estimates. In our model, the bulk of the welfare cost of inflation
can be attributed to the fact that it increases the effective tax rate on capital income.
Interestingly, only a relatively small portion of this cost component grows out of the fact
that inflation-induced increases in the effective tax rate reduce the after-tax real rate of
27
Both these effects are discussed by Feldstein (1996), who concludes that inflationdoes indeed increase
the effective tax rate oncorporate profits andthat overall, theeffect of inflationon theeffective tax rate
on income produced by firms in the form ofdividends and capital gains is actually somewhat larger than
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return on capital, a distortion whose impact has been studied previously. Instead, the
lion’s share of the welfare cost of inflation is due to the general equilibrium impact of
the increased effective tax rate on the before-tax real rate of return. Thus, our results
suggest that abstractingfrom general equilibrium considerations may seriously understate
the welfare cost of inflation, a conclusion we share with Dotsey and Ireland (1996). We
conclude that the impact of inflation on the macroeconomy may be far more corrosive
than most economists have previously believed.
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